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Benefit/Cost Analysis 
of U.S. Demining 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
• 1n 
A Benefit/ Cost (B/C} Analysis is a tool used to compare the rewards reaped 
by a program to the costs expended to accomplish it. The author discusses 
the B/ C analysis of demining operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
extrapolates the meaning of the results. 
by Major M ichael Litzelman, 
U.S. Special Operations 
Command 
Based on B/C theory, an analysis 
comparing the benefits co the costs of a 
program (benefits and costs received now 
and later, quamifiable and non-quantifi-
ab le) can be determined to assist the 
Unit e d States in controlling AP 
landmines through an American- led 
demining program. In this study, B/C 
analys is is used as a cool to evaluate the 
issue of the relevancy of using Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) dollars for a par-
ticular kind of humanitarian assistance 
program, demining AP landmines. 
There is an importallt U.S. interest 
co controllandmines, especially those rhar 
are imbedded in rhe land of countries that 
are of national and viral interest ro rhe 
United States and irs allies. Reducing or 
elim inating these weapons may help to 
stabilize an important area and region 
inimical co U.S. interests. T he existence 
of landmines has led to economic and 
pol itical calamity and creates a greater 
chance of them being used by a faction 
o r group aga inst innocent civilians or 
even U.S. personnel. AP landmines may 
sustain a culture of conflict and violence. 
Therefore, it may be in the United States' 
interest w ul timately assist in eliminat-
ing these undiscriminating weapons, 
which could be of direct benefit ro the 
United States and host nations (HNs). 
Data will be reviewed to calculate 
primary and secondary costs saved as a 
result of the U.S. Army's demining pro-
gram in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This study 
will measure rhe social costs oflandmines 
using the B/C approach and the social 
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cost of removing the mines by quanrify-
ing as many primary and secondary ben-
efits as possible. Examples of primary 
benefits include preventing loss oflife and 
limb. Secondary benefits may include 
land, farming and infrast ructure, which 
are part of an economic/social benefit and 
which can be used as a result of demining. 
Ethiopia 
---""'""'"" · ~balf11rt 
* N.t~c.Qit.l 
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M easuring Benefits and 
Costs 
The U.S. government (USG) 
Demining Program Funds, which are the 
actual sources of rhe (U.S.) funds and 
costs from FY93-FY97 of the Demining 
Program will be analyzed, as will the co-
ral amount of funds used for demining 
in Ethiopia. 
Matrixes of compiled performance 
impact data will be used to indicate some 
of the HN benefits of the Demining Pro-
gram, although the reader should keep 
in mind rhar some of these impacts, taken 
by themselves, are non-quantifiable. This 
data was acquired from the Special Op-
erations (Central) Command, MacDill 
Air Force Base, which received the data 
from the demining cen ters in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, and Asmara, Erirrea, 
and should be considered reliable. Th is 
study will recommend the demining pro-
gram if there is a greater excess of benefits 
over costs; and if rhe coral projected benefits 
are less than rhe total costs, the project will 
be deemed not worth underraking.1 
Costs from AP 
Landmines2 
Much of the costs from FY93-FY95 
were used for rhe ini tial start-up cost of 
rhe demining infrastructure, which in-
cluded renovating the demining head-
quarters and the training facilities, etc. 
These were the most significant costs at 
the start of the program. U .S. Army train-
ers and liaison personnel were sent to the 
HN in 1995 in order ro complete the 
stan-up phase and train rhe trainers. The 
total number of mines eliminated is im-
ponanr in respect to the fact that there 
are mines that could kill or injure if left 
in place. The number of hectares (one 
hectare is equal to I 0,000 square meters 
or 2.47 1 acres) and amount of roadway 
clea red indicares land char is now avail-
able for productive use. 
In sum, in Ethiopia, $6,089,000 
(U.S .) was spent from FY93-FY97 ro 
el iminate 325,625 mines char could po-
tentially have caused injuries or death. As 
a result of demining, over 7,391 hectares 
have been cleared and are available for 
productive use, 285 kilometers of road 
are now available to rhe populace, and 
159 villages were cleared of landmines. 
For Eritrea, $6,005,000 was expended for 
the demining program during this rime 
period, and, as a result, 43 villages were 
cleared. Over4,750 land mines were elimi-
nated. As a result of rhe demining, over 
26 1 hectares were cleared, and 35 kilo-
meters of road are now available for pro-
ductive use. 3 The dollar con triburions of 
the H Ns were not available." 
Primary and Secondary 
Benefits5 or Costs Saved 
Primary benefi ts include preventing 
people from being ki ll ed, inj ured or 
maimed by landmines, as well as the ben-
efit of saving medical costs co treat and 
rehabilitate person nel. Additional ben-
efits that are directly due co demining 
include evacuarion of rhe wounded, sur-
gical treatment, transfusion of blood, re-
habilitarion (often including prosthetic 
limbs, which must be fitted individually 
and must be replaced after some years). 
Severe disabili ty can lead, of course, to 
other incalculable costs.6·7 Econom ic and 
social consequences of mines, wh ich also 
transla te ro secondary benefits, might 
include farmland, firewood and d rinking 
water that would have been inaccessible 
because of the mines, as well as roads or 
tracks that would be impassable because 
of the landmines. 
This study used data from 
Anderson's study, which documenred the 
effecrs of landmines on the health and 
social conditions of co mmunities in 
32,904 households with 174,489 people 
living in communities of four affected 
countries, including 37 in Afghanistan, 
66 in Bosnia, 38 in Cambodia and 65 in 
Mozambique. Since Mozambique is simi-
lar to Ethiopia and Eritrea in many ways 
(culturally, geographically, ere.), this 
study used these findings as a surrogate 
market, as suggested by Gramlich,8 to 
extrapolate some of the possible costs 
saved for Ethiopia. For example, this re-
search determined the costs of death and 
injury based on data from Ethiopia, us-
ing th e following information from 
Mozambique: in Mozambique, each blast 
killed 1.45 people and wounded 1.27 . 
Roughly 40 percent of blasts resul ted in 
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on expected production 
without the mines, agricultural produc-
tion could increase by three to six per-
cent. T here were also costs associated with 
disabi li ties. The mosr common injury 
among survivors of landmine incidents 
is the loss of a leg. Many victims had to 
undergo multiple operations for their 
injuries. More than hal f of all victims were 
admitted, each spending an average of 
rwo months in a hospiral. 
Analysis 
The primary benefits rhar this study 
will consider include lives saved (deaths 
from each blasr), injuries prevented (in-
juries from each blast), transportation 
saved (cost of fees to the hospital), ad-
mission charge saved, bed charges saved, 
blood saved (or cost of blood saved) and 
amputation costs saved. Some of those 
figures for the method were taken from 
the study dealing wi th Mozambique.9 
All of the benefits of demining, how-
ever, cannot be quanrified. 10 T he study 
focused on only those benefits that can 
be quantified , such as the benefits of 
human life, the benefi ts obtained from 
using land that was once mined and the 
future benefits from saving the lives of 
farm animals. 11 
In order ro calculate whether the 
demining program will have net benefits 
over time, this study calculated present 
values. Present value is a stream of ben-
efits or costs expressed as the expected 
value in each year, discounted by the in-
terest rare compounded over that time. 
Non-comparable benefits and costs can 
be made comparable by expressing every-
thing in present value terms, which could 
indicate benefits realized over a period of 
time. C osts, especially for the start-up 
(i.e., building infrastructure), will be in-
dicated up-front, while some costs, such 
as monitoring the demining progress, will 
be recurrent. In this case, the study rraced 
out costs and benefits over rime (i.e., over 
a 30-year period, or other projections in 
the future) and potential maximum ben-
efits. 
Calculating Primary 
Benefits of Demining 
1
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Costs of lives saved is calculated us-
ing $550 in Ethiopia and $660 in Eritrea, 
the 1998 annual per capita income (per 
capita used since all victims would in-
clude men, women and ch ildren), and 
multiplying by rhe average number of 
lives saved per year as a result of the 
demining program . Data in the last 
couple of years for Ethiopia indicate be-
tween 60 and 120 I ives are lost due to 
the landmines per year. Approximately 76 
lives were lost in FY97; divided by 1.45 
(52 blasts), this yielded 76 deaths. Sev-
enty-six lives saved multiplied by $550, 
would mean $41,800 saved in Ethiopia 
for one year. E ritrea lost an ave rage of 10 
civilians in FY97, 10 lives saved multi-
plied by $660 yearly per capita income 
equals $6,600 saved per year. 
Calculations of other benefits were 
as follows: 
• Injuries prevented: In Ethiopia, 44 
persons injured divided by 1.27 from 35 
blasts, which yielded 44 injured (Ander-
son 1995). 12 Eritrea averaged 20 person-
nel injured per year. 
• Transportation costs saved: Fees to 
a hospital could range from $2.40 to 
$4.80. 13 T his study used the lowest, con-
servative number ($2.40). 
• Admission charge saved: the ad-
mission charge saved could range from 
$2.40 to $16.00. 13 Again, this study used 
the lowest conservative number ($2.40). 
• Bed charges saved: Bed charges (flat 
rate fee) saved has been approximated to 
be $.80.'3 
• Blood saved: Generally, for every 
100 landmine patients, 120 units of 
blood are required. A unit of blood costs 
Ethiopia Net Benefits 
(76 lives x $528 = $40,128 for FY97) 
10Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
15Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
20Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
25Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
30Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
3% 5% 
$348,547 $315,838 
$2,213,981 $2,001,284 
$2,562,528 $2,317,122 
$6,089,000 $6,089,000 
($3,526,472) ($3,771,878) 
$485,314 $422,786 
$3,104,239 $2,686,354 
$3,589,553 $3,109,140 
$6,089,000 $6,089,000 
($2,499,447) ($2,979,860) 
$603,697 $506,501 
$3,860,107 $3,226,555 
$4,463,804 $3,733,056 
$6,089,000 $6,089,000 
($1,625,196) ($2,355,944) 
$705,977 $572,082 
$4,512,122 $3,655,232 
$5,218,099 $4,227,314 
$6,089,000 $6,089,000 
($870,901) ($1,861,686) 
$793,972 $623,430 
$5,082,090 $3,988,775 
$5,876,062 $4,612,205 
$6,089,000 $6,089,000 
($212,938) ($1,476,795) 
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10% 
$252,517 
$1,108,542 
$1,361,059 
$6,089,000 
($4,727,941) 
$311,258 
$1,970,982 
$2,282,240 
$6,089,000 
($3,806,760) 
$347,809 
$2,208,038 
$2,555,847 
$6,089,000 
($3,533,153) 
$370,469 
$2,362,155 
$2,732,624 
$6,089,000 
($3,356,376) 
$384,536 
$2,444,820 
$2,829,356 
$6,089,000 
($3,259,644) 
• 
about $20, and a unit of saline costs ap-
proximately $1.00. 14 
• Amputation costs saved: Mine am-
putees may require a total of320 units of 
blood per 1 00 patients. 14 
• Rehabilitation costs saved: It costs 
approximately $125 to replace one lim b. 
The lower boundary fo r this study is the 
income for men, women and children 
(per capita) for workers or non-workers. 
In regards to the wages of the Ethiopian 
demincrs, the wages are the same as they 
receive while serving in the Ethiopian 
army. They cannot leave a job in the army 
si nce other jobs would be difficult to find. 
l t does nor matter how the individual 
deminer values their life (utility). 15 
Data Used to Calculate 
Secondary Benefits of 
Demining 
This study was able to quantifY the 
dollar value of cultivable land and acces-
sible grazing land, as well as the increase 
of forestry as a result of land being 
demined, using gross domestic product 
figures for FY93 for commercial purposes 
(agricultu re, grazing, forestry and fish ing), 
using projected present value at FY97, 
and data of cleared land from FY97. 
Calculation of secondary benefits 
were as follows: 
• Total area cleared: For one year in 
Ethiopia, the to tal area cleared was 6,112 
hectares or 15,1 02 acres, and for Eritrea, 
26 1 hectares cleared or 645 acres. The 
value per acre of land in Ethiopia is $ 14, 
whereas in Eritrea, which is th ree times 
smaller and much more arid and dry, the 
value per acre is $93.40. 
• Increase C ultivable Land: Of 
Ethiopia's to tal land, 12.7 percenr is used 
for growing crops, and in Eritrea, only five 
percent of the land is considered arable. 
• Accessible Grazing Land: In Ethio-
pia, 40.8 percent of the total land is used 
for grazing, which also applies ro Eritrea. 
• Forestry/Wood Industry: Of 
Ethiopia's total land, 24.6 percent is used 
as forest and woodland, whereas only five 
percent of Eritrea's land is used for these 
purposes. 
• Livestock Saved: In Ethiopia, 
l ,478 animals were lost in FY97, which 
when multiplied by $1 14, the value fo r 
each animal lost, is equal to $168,492 in 
animals saved by demining. Eritrea only 
lost a reported total of six livestock due 
ro landmines in FY97. This amounts to 
a value of $9 16 lost in that year. 
T he total worth of the above primary 
and secondary benefits over time was cal-
culated using percentages of discount 
rates, calculating rhe net benefits for the 
present value (tracing our costs and ben-
efits over time) of the maximum benefits 
over I 0, 12, 15, 20, 25 and 30 years at 
the discount rates of three percent (mini-
mum rate), five percent and I 0 percent 
(maximum rate) . 
The net benefi ts for each of the 
above periods at each of the above dis-
count rates is composed of rhe addition 
of primary and secondary benefits, which 
equals total benefits, and which is a rea-
sonable range over rime. The total cost 
of the program (FY93- FY97) is then sub-
tracted from the total benefits in order 
to calculate rhe net benefits. These cal-
culations could also demonstrate the op-
tion of doing nothing. Sensitivity is the 
change of assumptions, such as the num -
ber of potential victims saved and the 
ranges of plausible values. The Net Ben-
efits Spreadsheet for both Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (listed below) enabled this study 
to find the range of reasonable values, 
comparing the d iscount rates with the 
maximum benefits over the above years. 
T he Net Benefit Spreadsheet indi-
cates that shortfalls or costs are greater 
than the benefits and were almost exclu-
sively and predictably evident through-
out the demining process evident in both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, regardless of the 
Eritrea Net Benefits 
(10 lives x $622 = $6,220 for FY97) 
10Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Tota l Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
15 Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
20Years 
Primary Ben·efits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
25Years 
Primary Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
30Years 
Prima ry Benefits 
Secondary Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Total Costs 
Net Benefits 
3% 5% 
$55,530 $50,460 
$443,704 $401,499 
$499,234 $451,959 
$6,005,000 $6,005,000 
($5,505, 766) ($5,553,041) 
$76,808 $67,040 
$621,401 $539,773 
$698,209 $606,813 
$6,005,000 $6,005,000 
($5,306,791) ($5,398,187) 
$95,131 $80,015 
$774,116 $648,058 
$869,247 $728,073 
$6,005,000 $6,005,000 
($5,135,753) ($5,276,927) 
$110,928 $88,842 
$905,729 $733,018 
$1,016,657 $821,860 
$6,005,000 $6,005,000 
($4,988,343) ($5,183,140) 
$124,566 $98,136 
$1,019,568 $799,103 
$1,144,134 $897,239 
$6,005,000 $6,005,000 
($4,860,866) ($5,107,761) 
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10% 
$40,892 
$319,864 
$360,756 
$6,005,000 
($5,644,244) 
$49,995 
$395,943 
$445,938 
$6,005,000 
($5,559,062) 
$55,658 
$443,148 
$498,806 
$6,005,000 
($5,506,194) 
$59,168 
$473,124 
$532,292 
$6,005,000 
($5,472, 708) 
$61,347 
$490,898 
$522,245 
$6,005,000 
($5,482,755) 
• 
discounr period or year. T he data and 
analysis indicates that demining is not an 
appropriate B/C study for the United 
States when only the quantifiable ben-
efits and costs are analyzed over 30 years. 
Summary and 
Implications 
This swdy was only able to quantifY 
selective primary and secondary benefits, 
and other benefits that are non-quantifi -
able were considered. Costs saved due to 
eliminating deaths are what actually drive 
the costs of the landmines. 
The data and analysis indicate that 
demining is not an appropriate subject 
for benefit and cost study. Although costs 
have come early, which is typical for B/C 
analysis, benefits only exceed costs in two 
situations. Using the present value met h-
ods of comparing future costs and ben-
efits (p rimary and secondary) i.e., li ves 
and injuries of HN personnel indicates 
that benefits do not exceed costs in ei-
ther country regardless of the d iscount 
rare or years in operation (one to 30 
years). Benefits do not exceed costs in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea at any point in this 
study. In terms of benefits and costs, the 
U.S. demining program should nor ex-
peer benefits to exceed costs within 30 
years. However, if human lives and qual-
ity of life are to be taken seriously, th is 
humanitarian benefit should be enough 
for the United States to contribute a 
demining program to these countries. In 
terms of these lives, something should be 
done in order to prevent the potential loss 
of life and limb. The following table lists 
the benefits and costs of the U.S./HN 
demining program. 
The non-quantifiable benefits fo r 
the United States appear to vastly out-
weigh the costs ($6 mi llion) of rhe 
dem ining program. For the HN, quanti-
fiable and non-quantifiable benefits far 
outweigh the costs, especially if one rakes 
into account the primary and secondary 
benefits of Ethiopia. 
For a demining operation, one could 
determine the winners and losers. Losers 
of the program could include the Ameri -
can taxpayer, if one were to just count 
the U.S. quantifiable benefi ts. If one were 
to rake into account the U.S. non-quan-
2
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tifiable benefits, the American taxpayer 
would be a winner (see above list) . The 
United States may eventually be able to 
gain many of these benefits whi le on ly 
supporting the start-up of the program. 
One unforeseen benefit from Ameri-
can assistance to Ethiopia was support 
from the coumry at a crucial rime when 
U.S. viral interests were at stake. After the 
United States supported communis t 
Eth iopi a during t he ir devastating 
droughts in the 1980s, Ethiopia in turn 
voted for a critical American resolution 
in the UN Security Council to support a 
military build-up after the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. 
"Ethiop ia's greatest potential to im-
prove t hei r councry economically is 
through the promise of agricultural de-
velopmem because of the fertile soil and 
rainfall. It accounts for 47 percent of the 
G ross D omestic Product (GOP) and Is 
Benefits and Casts of U.S. Demlnlng Programs In Ethiopia and Eritrea 
U.S. QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS U.S. QUANTIFIABLE COSTS 
None None 
U.S. NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS 
Creating intangible moral, humanitarian benefits 
Promote regional and country stability in HN 
Creates friendly countries amicable to U.S. interests 
HN more supportive to U.S. interests 
Strengthens relations with HN 
Attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives 
Access to foreign bases and transport facilities 
Provide example of how military con promote good 
Provides military access to DoD 
Provides political access to DOS 
Creates intelligence gathering 
Provides Commanders-in-chief with peace-time means 
of achieving goals 
Provide training benefit to Special Operations Forces 
Increases morale among U.S. troops 
Provides humanitarian support to war-torn HN 
Benefits U.S. demining companies 
Boosts mine clearing U.S. technologies 
Enhanced public relations with international community 
Enhanced foreign policy in public relations and good will 
Access to regional transportation 
Agriculture benefits (importation of HN goods) 
HN QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS 
Ethiopia: 292,791 landmines destroyed 
Eritrea: 2,852 londmines destroyed 
For both Ethiopia/ Eritrea: 500,000 potential lives saved 
76 lives saved per year for Ethiopia 
10 lives saved for Eritrea 
44 injuries saved per year in Ethiopia 
20 injuries saved for Eritrea 
1,478 livestock saved per year for Ethiopia 
6 for Eritrea 
For both Ethiopia/ Eritreo: 11 facilities constructed 
and renovated120 vehicles for demining 
15,102 acres cleared for Ethiopia 
645 acres cleared in Eritrea 
282 km of infrastructure cleared in Ethiopia 
35 cleared in Eritrea 
97 Trainers trained in demining, public awareness, and 
historical research, and 356 HN personnel trained 
$12,000 influx of U.S. dollars in local economy 
HN NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS 
Contribute toward stabilization in HN 
Coordination for donations provided by 
other countries and U.S. organizations 
Active employment of soldiers for peaceful means 
Assistance with infrastructure development 
Increase of prestige and security from U.S. alliances 
Potential increases the rote of repatriation of refugees 
Reduce unemployment increases (costs) 
Donations of medical aid packages 
U.S. NON-QUANTIFIABLE COSTS 
Threatens readiness for some troops 
HN QUANTIFIABLE COSTS 
Data not available 
HN NON-QUANTIFIABLE COSTS 
Potential loss of sovereignty 
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the most important secto r of rhe 
economy." 16 Agricultural development 
has been potentially expanded to regions 
that were demined. Mi ne incidents have 
significantly decreased with the local 
herdsmen and farmers, which has con-
tributed to the successes of the nations as 
a result of the U.S. dem ining program 
according to MSG Barthol omew and 
MSG Johnson.17 H owever, there is as yet 
no data to support that assertion by these 
two individuals who played a large part 
in setting up the demining program in 
both countries. 
Other benefits, in terms of the U.S. 
demining programs' original goals and 
objectives are listed below. 18 
(1) Enabling the Unit ed States to 
make a tangible diffe re nce to people 
struggling to rebuild their lives after long 
years of war: The DoD has provided U.S. 
trainers who have trained the Ethiopians 
and Eritreans in demining, public aware-
ness and historical research. Since 1993, 
rhe U.S. demining program has produced 
more tangible benefits in Ethiopia than 
in Eritrea, i. e., 325,625 mines eliminated 
and 1 5, I 02 acres cleared in Ethiopia ver-
sus 4,750 mines destroyed and 645 acres 
cleared in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, 285 road-
ways have been cleared, versus 35 in 
Eritrea. U.S. trainers also provided hu-
manitarian donations in veh icles (more 
than I 20 ) for both countri es and medi-
cal aid packages (medical, equipment-re-
lated and ambulatory). They also assisted 
in creating a demin ing infrastructure by 
supporting the construction and renova-
tion of 1 I facili ties. The United States 
has helped to conduct emergency medi-
cal care in hospitals and implemented 
new surgical techniq ues fo r injuries as a 
result of landmines, in addition to sup-
pl ying mine detection devices, public 
awareness training, hisrorical research and 
demining training. U .S. demining may 
also help to redistribute some wealth from 
the United States ro the Ethiopian gov-
ernment. For example, some costs have 
been inflated for some services to get 
Ethiopian participation, such as the costs 
of contracting the transportation for the 
demin in g eq uipment, which totaled 
$ 12,000. The U.S. government has also 
led support including coordination for 
donations provided by other countries 
and other organizations.17· 19 ln addition, 
the United States has helped governments 
such as Ethiopia and Eritrea help them-
selves by educating civilians on the dam-
ages and locations of landmines, and by 
prov iding badly needed humanitarian 
support to these war- torn countries. 
T hese benefits are manifest, tangible, 
q uantifiable achievements. If impl e-
mented , the primary and secondary ben-
efits, as listed in this article, can make a 
real difference in the lives of the com-
mon people of Ethiopia. 
(2) Promoting stabili ty by enabl ing 
countries to better solve their problems, 
rebuild their economies and build pub-
lic confidence in their governments by 
meeting the n eed s of the peopl e. 
Demining programs do not produce a 
panacea. Today, Ethiopia appears to be 
stable within its own borders, but the U.S. 
demining program has not directly pro-
duced stabi li ty between Ethiopia and 
Eri trea in terms of preventing these coun-
tries from fighting one another. From 
May 1998 to June 2000, fighting broke 
out along a disputed border area of these 
two countries. T he Un ited Stares esti -
mated that between 50,000 and I 00 ,000 
soldiers died, with both countries using 
valuable resources to buy mili tary hard-
ware to fight each other.20 
Som e other potential benefits that 
have been lauded have been regional sta-
bility, promotion of democracy and eco-
nomic development.2 1 Wi th rhe fighting 
occurring in the Horn of Africa between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, regional stability has 
not been a benefi t, although demining 
has helped to limit the accessibi lity of 
m ines that were destroyed to rhese coun-
tries' arsenals . .In regards to promoting 
democracy, Ethiopian citizens have been 
repressed , and some have actually been 
to rtured after being arrested. 15· 22 H ow-
ever, some inroads have been made to-
ward democracy. W hen Ethiopia claimed 
victory in May of2000, it came ahead of 
general elections scheduled on May 14 , 
only the second general election in rhe 
country's history. An estimated 20 mil-
lio n registered voters chose members of 
the 548-seat federal parliament, nine re-
gional assemblies, and rwo citycoun cils.2.l· 24 
T his study has shown that Ethiopia 
has misused vehicles for purposes other 
than demining, their original intended 
use; in addition, an American renovated 
headquarters in Ethiopia is being used as 
a military academy. Agriculture, grazing 
and forestry development may also be 
expanded as a result of demining for both 
countries, although no data exists as to 
whether this land is being productively used. 
(3) Strength ening U.S. relat ions 
with these governmenrs at a critical rime 
in which rhe governments are engaged in 
nation-building. There is no way of 
knowing whether rhe access and trust 
gained from the demining programs di-
rectly produced conflict resolution in the 
case of Ethiopia and Eritrea during their 
recent war. Although the U.S. govern-
ment was unable to stop both sides fro m 
fighting o ne another in the early part of 
rhe conflict, it did help to persuade both 
sides to negotiate an end to the conflict 
in June of 2000. Such international or-
ganizations as rhe European Union and 
the Organization of African Uni ty as well 
as UN Secretary Kofi Annan appear to 
have had litrle influence in the recent 
conflicr.25 A question remains as to the 
degree of American influence with Ethio-
pia and Eritrea. 
(4) Providing a valuable example ro 
these countries of how a military can pro-
mote the public good rather than just 
wage war and oppress people. As men-
tioned above, the demining program is 
promoting public good and has shown 
its citizens that rhe military can be used 
fo r other purposes than oppressing irs 
own people, although some of the re-
sources, as noted earlier in this article, 
have been used for other purposes. Some 
critics are also alarmed that foreign gov-
ernments, such as the United States, do-
nate hundreds of millions of dollars in 
aid, despite mounting allegations of hu-
man rights violations.26 
(5) Providing an invaluable training 
benefi t to U.S. troo ps, giving them ex-
perience in relating to d iverse cul tures, 
organizing prog rams in sparse, fore ign 
environments and honing foreign lan-
guage ski lls. Readiness is supposed to be 
enhanced with uni ts and personnel exer-
cising joinr and inrer-service operations, 
and critical wartime skills are practiced. 
However, some of the military ch iefs have 
questioned whether readiness has actu-
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ally been enhanced as a result of the nu-
merous deployments, which have resulted 
in less train ing for service personnel. 
W inslow Wheeler, a d efense analyst 
" ... found evidence of extremely serious 
Army-wide personnel and training prob-
lems. The Senate Budget Committee ap-
peared primed to join the critics of the 
administration who say the Pentagon robs 
readiness accounts to pay for peacekeep-
ing operations. An internal report by the 
panel's senior defense analyst has concluded 
that Army readiness at irs tvvo major stare-
side combat training centers is inadequate 
and could become even worse .... "27 
This study has found that th is may 
be true for peacekeeping operations, bur 
not for the humanitarian demining op-
erations, which consist of Special Opera-
tion Forces (SOF). lnitially, U.S. Special 
Operation soldiers28 gained access and ex-
perience, but th is was generally during 
the period of building its demining in-
frastructure, while training the Ethiopian 
soldiers how to train their own person-
nel. Since then, only a few liaison offic-
ers have gained rhat experience. SOF sol-
diers have continued ro train in-country, 
but on other soldier tasks (i.e., infant ry 
skills) as well. A demining program could 
o nly consist of a few months, deployment 
for these el ite personnel , who would train 
the host nationals. 
(6) Generally increas ing morale 
among U.S. troops while enabl ing them 
to engage in acti vities wirh measurable 
benefi ts that are greatly appreciated by 
the host population. Morale among U.S. 
troops has nor been surveyed. 
Conclusion 
In sum, there is normally a lack of 
competitio n for a pub I ic good, especially 
a purely public good, such as a demining 
program. Competition is necessary to 
prevent market failure (and non-marker 
failure). Sust a in ed co mpetitio n in 
demining operations from the ini ti al 
implementation by the United Stares ro 
the sustainment by UN fo rces and 
NGOs, with cooperation from HN 
demining programs should produce th is 
essential public good of demining. The 
long term winners from demining operations 
are the H N people and their government; 
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the short-term losers are those who fund 
the program, especially paying ou r the 
capital expenses, i.e., American taxpayers. 
But rhe United Stares will also benefi r in 
rhe longterm as the projected non-quan-
tifi able benefi ts indicate. • 
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The precise figures of number of mines and inju-
ries and deaths of dcminers were not available ro 
this study. 
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6. Vict ims of AP mi nes who survive inju ry 
and rrcarmcm arc usuall y left with severe disabiliry, 
which can le.td to unemployment, divorce, poor 
prospects for marriage and being ostracized. All such 
situations have been witnessed but have not been 
quantified (Coupland 1995). 
7 . Coupland, R.M. 1996. "The Ef fects of 
Weapons: Surgical Challenge and Medical Dilemma." 
The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh. 
8. Gramlich, Edward M. 1990. A Guide to 
Benefit-Cost Analysis. 2"J Ed., Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J .: Prentice Hall. 
9. Quade, Gramlich, ere., have emphasized 
in their respective books that benefi ts may be very 
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to suspend major parts of rhe program for varying 
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our project areas" (Internet on Eth iopia, 1998). 
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The demining headquarters in the I-IN, the Erhio-
pian Ministry of Defense, DoD Humanitarian 
Demining and Special Operations Command Cen-
tral, MacDill Air f'orce Base, Tampa, Florida. 
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annually with hundreds of millions of dollars in 
aid, even though there arc mounting allegations of 
human rights violarions (Buckley 1998). 
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24 . Amy Aleum. a recent emigree to rhe 
United Stares from Eth iopia, claims that "The cur-
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kept the offtcials from the Mengitsu government 
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26. The current Mcles regime is alleged to 
have comm itted many human rights violations since 
it rook power in 1991. The government has arrested 
thousands of critics and opponents. It has detained 
more journalists in the past three years than any 
other African government. Two years ago, the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross estimated 
that I 0,000 Ethiopians were in prison for political 
or national security reasons (Buckley 1998). 
27. Weible, Jack. 1998. "Congress to consider 
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The U.S. Humanitarian 
Demining Research and 
Development Program 
The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (R&D) Program 
rapidly develops, evaluates and demonstrates equipment for humanitarian 
demining, hoping to improve the overall safety of the individual deminer 
and the efficiency of humanitarian demining operations worldwide. By 
collaborating with a number of different members of the humanitarian 
demining community, the R&D Program strives to cater to the needs of those 
in the field and effectively fill any tech nology gaps as quickly as possible. 
by Nicole Kreger, MAIC 
Introduction 
History 
The U.S. H umanitarian Demin ing 
R&D Program was conceived in late 
1992 and early 1993, when the D irector 
for Acquisition in the Office of the As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for 
Special Operations and Low-Inrensity 
Conflict (SO/UC) deve loped several 
concept proposals for a rapid-prototype 
program. The Undersecretaries of Policy 
and Acquisition supported the proposal, 
considering it a logical and necessary 
technology in itia tive to be part of SO/ 
LIC's rasks in the low-intensity and peace-
rime engagement arena. When the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (ASD) SO/ U C 
requested support, funding was identi-
fied in the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and was scheduled to 
begin in Fiscal Year (FY) 1996. Decid ing 
rhar there was a more immediate need 
for the program, Congress provided ad-
dit io nal fu nds to the U .S. Army's 
Countermine Program to fund humani-
tarian demining fo r FY 1995. Congress 
has continued to support the R&D Program. 
Since the program's beginnings, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has been 
researching cost-effective technologies for 
the demining com munity. Since then , 
sign ificant p rogress has been made in 
developing and improving tools and tech-
nologies fo r humanitarian dem ining. 
These devices assist in clearing, detect-
ing, marking, mapping and neutralizing 
mines, p rotecting deminers, clearing veg-
etation and promoting mine awareness. 
T he most successful of these have been 
deployed in nations all over the world to 
undergo field resting. 
The DoD Humanitarian Demining 
R&D Program is parr of the Nigh t Vi-
sion and Electronic Sensors D irectorate 
(NVESD) at Fort Belvoi r, Vi rginia. The 
Program strives "to provide suitable tech-
nology to derect and clear all landm ines, 
improve operator safety, and provide spe-
cial small and handheld tools for opera-
tors."1 According to a video on the 
program's website, "The Humanitarian 
Demining R&D Program focuses on the 
testing, demonstration and validation of 
various equipmenrs suitable for immedi-
ate use in various international human i-
tarian demining mission envi ronments."2 
How the Program Works 
T he program operates on a multi-
year investment strategy as follows: 
o Annual requirements workshops 
involving people from affected coumries 
are used to identifY system requi remems. 
o Data analyses and assessments deter-
mine rhe system requiremems in rwo ways: 
I . Determining rhe performance ca-
pabi lities of commercially available metal 
detectors to identifY AP mines in countries 
where a significant number of mine-related 
111Juries are occurring. 
2. ldemifYing where technology voids 
exist. 
o Marker surveys identifY commer-
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cially available items for detection and 
clearance, which are rhen sorted and stored 
in fu lly searchable databases. The data-
bases are updated and maintained on the 
Internet, and they serve as the basis for 
identifYing available equipment rhat may 
be suitable for Humanitarian Demining. 
0 Developmental rests are conducted 
at FortAP Hill, which has the ranges ro sup-
port live and inert mine testing. From these 
rests, changes are recommended and imple-
mented, after which the tools are retested. 
0 In-country fie ld-testing is per-
formed and suppon training is conducted 
for indigenous personnel wirh multi-l in-
gual multimedia on equipment operation. 
T he real driving force behind the 
R&D Program is its Annual Requi re-
ments Workshop, held in no rthern Vir-
gin ia. Deminers from non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) and Mine Ac-
tion Centers (MACs) attend this event 
to give an update on their programs' tech-
nology requirements. This is the best way 
for the R&D Program to get feedback 
on current projects and ideas for the fu-
ture. It also gives deminers from all over 
rhe wo rld an opportunity to interact and 
d iscuss their successes and lessons learned 
with one another. In-coun try assess-
ments-also known as operational field 
evaluations-are another key ro raring the 
needs of specific demining operations. A 
team of rhe R&D Program's engineers 
perform the assessments, after which rhe 
host nation submits a fo rmal request fo r 
specific tools . 
The R&D Program interacts with 
private industry, academia, other U.S . 
and foreign government laboratories and 
Army in-house laboratories and work-
shops in a slew of countries in order to 
identifY emerging technologies that may 
be suitable for humanitarian demining 
missions. O nce a new rool or technology 
has been successfi.tll y analyzed, it is deployed 
to demin ing organizations worldwide so 
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